Nuprl Lemma : CR-authentication-theorem

∀sth:SecurityTheory
  (CR-protocol |= CR-initiator3 authenticates 2 messages  ∧ CR-protocol |= CR-responder3 authenticates 3 messages )


Proof




Definitions occuring in Statement :  CR-protocol: CR-protocol,  CR-responder3: CR-responder3,  CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3,  authentication: prtcl |= bs authenticates n messages ,  sth-es: sth-es(s),  security-theory: SecurityTheory,  all: ∀x:A. B[x],  and: P ∧ Q,  natural_number: $n
Definitions unfolded in proof :  all: ∀x:A. B[x],  and: P ∧ Q,  cand: A c∧ B,  member: t ∈ T,  uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],  implies: P ⇒ Q,  guard: {T},  ses-axioms: SecurityAxioms,  uimplies: b supposing a,  authentication: prtcl |= bs authenticates n messages ,  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  exists: ∃x:A. B[x],  prop: ℙ,  CR-protocol: CR-protocol,  ses-protocol1-thread: (thr is one of bss at A),  so_lambda: λ2x.t[x],  subtype_rel: A ⊆r B,  so_apply: x[s],  iff: P ⇐⇒ Q,  rev_implies: P ⇐ Q,  or: P ∨ Q,  is-basic-seq: thr[A;B] |= bs,  CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3,  basic-seq-1-5: A ⟶ B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y;z],  ses-is-protocol-actions: pas(thr),  append: as @ bs,  so_lambda: so_lambda(x,y,z.t[x; y; z]),  top: Top,  so_apply: x[s1;s2;s3],  ses-thread: Thread,  int_seg: {i..j-},  lelt: i ≤ j < k,  decidable: Dec(P),  satisfiable_int_formula: satisfiable_int_formula(fmla),  false: False,  not: ¬A,  ses-act: Act,  sq_stable: SqStable(P),  es-locl: (e <loc e'),  es-causl: (e < e'),  squash: ↓T,  sq_type: SQType(T),  subtract: n - m,  le: A ≤ B,  less_than': less_than'(a;b),  less_than: a < b,  true: True,  mk-pa: n(v),  ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),  select: L[n],  cons: [a / b],  eq_atom: x =a y,  ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,  btrue: tt,  bfalse: ff,  ses-V: PropertyV,  es-E-interface: E(X),  Id: Id,  ses-S: PropertyS,  ses-signer: signer(e),  pi2: snd(t),  pi1: fst(t),  ses-protocol1: Protocol1(bss),  ses-action: Action(e),  CR-initiator1: CR-initiator1{i:l}(s),  basic-seq-1-1: A ⟶ B: pas[A; B; m],  ses-thread-member: e ∈ thr,  CR-initiator2: CR-initiator2{i:l}(s),  basic-seq-1-3: A ⟶ B: pas[A; B; m; n; x],  so_lambda: λ2x y.t[x; y],  so_apply: x[s1;s2],  uiff: uiff(P;Q),  rev_uimplies: rev_uimplies(P;Q),  ses-NR: PropertyNR,  ses-thread-loc: loc(thr)= A,  event-has: (e has a),  class-value-has: X(e) has a,  sig-release-thread: sig-release-thread(s;es;A;thr),  ses-sig: signature(e),  ses-NU: PropertyNU,  label: ...$L... t,  CR-responder1: CR-responder1{i:l}(s),  CR-responder2: CR-responder2{i:l}(s),  basic-seq-1-4: A ⟶ B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y],  CR-responder3: CR-responder3,  nat: ℕ,  nil: [],  it: ⋅,  ge: i ≥ j ,  matching-conversation: MatchingConversation(n;thr1;thr2),  thread-messages: thread-messages(thr),  firstn: firstn(n;as),  lt_int: i <z j,  send-rcv-match: send-rcv-match(m1;m2)

Latex:
\mforall{}sth:SecurityTheory
    (CR-protocol  |=  CR-initiator3  authenticates  2  messages 
    \mwedge{}  CR-protocol  |=  CR-responder3  authenticates  3  messages  )



Date html generated: 2016_05_17-PM-00_49_45
Last ObjectModification: 2016_01_18-PM-07_04_19

Theory : event-logic-applications


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