Nuprl Lemma : CR-authentication-theorem

sth:SecurityTheory
  (CR-protocol |= CR-initiator3 authenticates messages  ∧ CR-protocol |= CR-responder3 authenticates messages )


Proof




Definitions occuring in Statement :  CR-protocol: CR-protocol CR-responder3: CR-responder3 CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3 authentication: prtcl |= bs authenticates messages  sth-es: sth-es(s) security-theory: SecurityTheory all: x:A. B[x] and: P ∧ Q natural_number: $n
Definitions unfolded in proof :  all: x:A. B[x] and: P ∧ Q cand: c∧ B member: t ∈ T uall: [x:A]. B[x] implies:  Q guard: {T} ses-axioms: SecurityAxioms uimplies: supposing a authentication: prtcl |= bs authenticates messages  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint exists: x:A. B[x] prop: CR-protocol: CR-protocol ses-protocol1-thread: (thr is one of bss at A) so_lambda: λ2x.t[x] subtype_rel: A ⊆B so_apply: x[s] iff: ⇐⇒ Q rev_implies:  Q or: P ∨ Q is-basic-seq: thr[A;B] |= bs CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3 basic-seq-1-5: A ⟶ B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y;z] ses-is-protocol-actions: pas(thr) append: as bs so_lambda: so_lambda(x,y,z.t[x; y; z]) top: Top so_apply: x[s1;s2;s3] ses-thread: Thread int_seg: {i..j-} lelt: i ≤ j < k decidable: Dec(P) satisfiable_int_formula: satisfiable_int_formula(fmla) false: False not: ¬A ses-act: Act sq_stable: SqStable(P) es-locl: (e <loc e') es-causl: (e < e') squash: T sq_type: SQType(T) subtract: m le: A ≤ B less_than': less_than'(a;b) less_than: a < b true: True mk-pa: n(v) ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e) select: L[n] cons: [a b] eq_atom: =a y ifthenelse: if then else fi  btrue: tt bfalse: ff ses-V: PropertyV es-E-interface: E(X) Id: Id ses-S: PropertyS ses-signer: signer(e) pi2: snd(t) pi1: fst(t) ses-protocol1: Protocol1(bss) ses-action: Action(e) CR-initiator1: CR-initiator1{i:l}(s) basic-seq-1-1: A ⟶ B: pas[A; B; m] ses-thread-member: e ∈ thr CR-initiator2: CR-initiator2{i:l}(s) basic-seq-1-3: A ⟶ B: pas[A; B; m; n; x] so_lambda: λ2y.t[x; y] so_apply: x[s1;s2] uiff: uiff(P;Q) rev_uimplies: rev_uimplies(P;Q) ses-NR: PropertyNR ses-thread-loc: loc(thr)= A event-has: (e has a) class-value-has: X(e) has a sig-release-thread: sig-release-thread(s;es;A;thr) ses-sig: signature(e) ses-NU: PropertyNU label: ...$L... t CR-responder1: CR-responder1{i:l}(s) CR-responder2: CR-responder2{i:l}(s) basic-seq-1-4: A ⟶ B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y] CR-responder3: CR-responder3 nat: nil: [] it: ge: i ≥  matching-conversation: MatchingConversation(n;thr1;thr2) thread-messages: thread-messages(thr) firstn: firstn(n;as) lt_int: i <j send-rcv-match: send-rcv-match(m1;m2)

Latex:
\mforall{}sth:SecurityTheory
    (CR-protocol  |=  CR-initiator3  authenticates  2  messages 
    \mwedge{}  CR-protocol  |=  CR-responder3  authenticates  3  messages  )



Date html generated: 2016_05_17-PM-00_49_45
Last ObjectModification: 2016_01_18-PM-07_04_19

Theory : event-logic-applications


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