Nuprl Lemma : mk-pa_wf
(∀[a:Atom1]. ("new"(a) ∈ ProtocolAction))
∧ (∀[d:SecurityData]. ("send"(d) ∈ ProtocolAction))
∧ (∀[d:SecurityData]. ("rcv"(d) ∈ ProtocolAction))
∧ (∀[tr:SecurityData × Key × Atom1]. ("encrypt"(tr) ∈ ProtocolAction))
∧ (∀[tr:SecurityData × Key × Atom1]. ("decrypt"(tr) ∈ ProtocolAction))
∧ (∀[tr:SecurityData × Id × Atom1]. ("sign"(tr) ∈ ProtocolAction))
∧ (∀[tr:SecurityData × Id × Atom1]. ("verify"(tr) ∈ ProtocolAction))
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
mk-pa: n(v),
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
encryption-key: Key,
sdata: SecurityData,
Id: Id,
atom: Atom$n,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
and: P ∧ Q,
member: t ∈ T,
product: x:A × B[x],
token: "$token"
Definitions unfolded in proof :
and: P ∧ Q,
cand: A c∧ B,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
member: t ∈ T,
mk-pa: n(v),
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
eq_atom: x =a y,
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
btrue: tt,
all: ∀x:A. B[x],
implies: P ⇒ Q,
bool: 𝔹,
unit: Unit,
it: ⋅,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
uimplies: b supposing a,
bfalse: ff,
exists: ∃x:A. B[x],
prop: ℙ,
or: P ∨ Q,
sq_type: SQType(T),
guard: {T},
bnot: ¬bb,
assert: ↑b,
false: False
Latex:
(\mforall{}[a:Atom1]. ("new"(a) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[d:SecurityData]. ("send"(d) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[d:SecurityData]. ("rcv"(d) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[tr:SecurityData \mtimes{} Key \mtimes{} Atom1]. ("encrypt"(tr) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[tr:SecurityData \mtimes{} Key \mtimes{} Atom1]. ("decrypt"(tr) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[tr:SecurityData \mtimes{} Id \mtimes{} Atom1]. ("sign"(tr) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[tr:SecurityData \mtimes{} Id \mtimes{} Atom1]. ("verify"(tr) \mmember{} ProtocolAction))
Date html generated:
2016_05_17-PM-00_39_34
Last ObjectModification:
2015_12_29-PM-06_33_15
Theory : event-logic-applications
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