Nuprl Lemma : ses-cipher-unique2
∀[s:SES]
∀[es:EO+(Info)]. ∀[a,b:E(Encrypt)].
{(plainText(a) = plainText(b) ∈ SecurityData) ∧ (key(a) = key(b) ∈ Key)}
supposing cipherText(a) = cipherText(b) ∈ Atom1
supposing PropertyO
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-ordering: PropertyO,
ses-crypt: cipherText(e),
ses-encryption-key: key(e),
ses-encrypted: plainText(e),
ses-encrypt: Encrypt,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
encryption-key: Key,
sdata: SecurityData,
es-E-interface: E(X),
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
atom: Atom$n,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
guard: {T},
and: P ∧ Q,
equal: s = t ∈ T
Definitions unfolded in proof :
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
uimplies: b supposing a,
member: t ∈ T,
all: ∀x:A. B[x],
implies: P ⇒ Q,
guard: {T},
and: P ∧ Q,
prop: ℙ,
subtype_rel: A ⊆r B,
so_lambda: λ2x y.t[x; y],
so_apply: x[s1;s2],
top: Top,
ses-encryption-key: key(e),
ses-encrypted: plainText(e),
cand: A c∧ B,
squash: ↓T,
true: True,
iff: P ⇐⇒ Q,
rev_implies: P ⇐ Q,
so_lambda: λ2x.t[x],
so_apply: x[s]
Latex:
\mforall{}[s:SES]
\mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]. \mforall{}[a,b:E(Encrypt)].
\{(plainText(a) = plainText(b)) \mwedge{} (key(a) = key(b))\} supposing cipherText(a) = cipherText(b)
supposing PropertyO
Date html generated:
2016_05_17-PM-00_24_14
Last ObjectModification:
2016_01_18-AM-07_44_30
Theory : event-logic-applications
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