Nuprl Lemma : ses-sign-is-protocol-action
∀[s:SES]
∀[pa:ProtocolAction]. ∀[es:EO+(Info)]. ∀[e:E].
({((fst(pa)) = "sign" ∈ Atom) ∧ ((snd(pa)) = Sign(e) ∈ (SecurityData × Id × Atom1))}) supposing
((↑e ∈b Sign) and
pa(e))
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-sign: Sign,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
sdata: SecurityData,
eclass-val: X(e),
in-eclass: e ∈b X,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-E: E,
Id: Id,
atom: Atom$n,
assert: ↑b,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
guard: {T},
pi1: fst(t),
pi2: snd(t),
and: P ∧ Q,
product: x:A × B[x],
token: "$token",
atom: Atom,
equal: s = t ∈ T
Definitions unfolded in proof :
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
member: t ∈ T,
uimplies: b supposing a,
guard: {T},
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),
pi1: fst(t),
pi2: snd(t),
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
all: ∀x:A. B[x],
exists: ∃x:A. B[x],
and: P ∧ Q,
cand: A c∧ B,
implies: P ⇒ Q,
bool: 𝔹,
unit: Unit,
it: ⋅,
btrue: tt,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
satisfiable_int_formula: satisfiable_int_formula(fmla),
false: False,
not: ¬A,
top: Top,
prop: ℙ,
subtype_rel: A ⊆r B,
so_lambda: λ2x y.t[x; y],
so_apply: x[s1;s2],
bfalse: ff,
or: P ∨ Q,
sq_type: SQType(T),
bnot: ¬bb,
assert: ↑b,
nequal: a ≠ b ∈ T
Latex:
\mforall{}[s:SES]
\mforall{}[pa:ProtocolAction]. \mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]. \mforall{}[e:E].
(\{((fst(pa)) = "sign") \mwedge{} ((snd(pa)) = Sign(e))\}) supposing ((\muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Sign) and pa(e))
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Date html generated:
2016_05_17-PM-00_39_58
Last ObjectModification:
2016_01_18-AM-07_42_37
Theory : event-logic-applications
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