Nuprl Lemma : ses-private-one-one
∀[s:SES]. ∀[A,B:Id]. uiff(PrivateKey(A) = PrivateKey(B) ∈ Key;A = B ∈ Id) supposing PropertyK
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-K: PropertyK,
ses-private-key: PrivateKey(A),
security-event-structure: SES,
encryption-key: Key,
Id: Id,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
equal: s = t ∈ T
Definitions unfolded in proof :
ses-private-key: PrivateKey(A),
encryption-key: Key,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
member: t ∈ T,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
and: P ∧ Q,
prop: ℙ,
guard: {T},
ses-K: PropertyK,
all: ∀x:A. B[x],
iff: P ⇐⇒ Q,
implies: P ⇒ Q
Latex:
\mforall{}[s:SES]. \mforall{}[A,B:Id]. uiff(PrivateKey(A) = PrivateKey(B);A = B) supposing PropertyK
Date html generated:
2016_05_17-PM-00_26_21
Last ObjectModification:
2015_12_29-PM-06_38_25
Theory : event-logic-applications
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