{ 
[s:SES]. [A:Id]. (Honest(A) 
(Ax 
Honest(A))) }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-honest: Honest(A),
security-event-structure: SES,
Id: Id,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
implies: P Q,
member: t T,
axiom: Ax
Definitions :
sdata: SecurityData,
event_ordering: EO,
es-E: E,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
subtype: S 
T,
fpf: a:A fp-> B[a],
strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B),
pi1: fst(t),
decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y],
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
assert: 
b,
le: A 
B,
ge: i 
j ,
not: 
A,
less_than: a < b,
uimplies: b supposing a,
and: P 
Q,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
subtype_rel: A r B,
all: x:A. B[x],
prop: 
,
axiom: Ax,
ses-honest: Honest(A),
lambda: 
x.A[x],
security-event-structure: SES,
product: x:A 
B[x],
top: Top,
atom: Atom$n,
encryption-key: Key,
bool: 
,
eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]),
so_lambda: 
x y.t[x; y],
universe: Type,
equal: s = t,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
Id: Id,
isect: 
x:A. B[x],
member: t T,
implies: P Q,
function: x:A 
B[x],
Auto: Error :Auto,
Unfold: Error :Unfold,
CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN,
tactic: Error :tactic,
natural_number: $n,
int: 
,
false: False,
true: True,
unit: Unit,
union: left + right,
void: Void,
apply: f a,
pi2: snd(t),
so_lambda: x.t[x]
Lemmas :
pi1_wf,
pi2_wf,
pi1_wf_top,
true_wf,
false_wf,
eclass_wf,
Id_wf,
bool_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
top_wf,
member_wf,
security-event-structure_wf,
ses-honest_wf,
event-ordering+_wf,
es-E_wf,
event-ordering+_inc,
sdata_wf
\mforall{}[s:SES]. \mforall{}[A:Id]. (Honest(A) {}\mRightarrow{} (Ax \mmember{} Honest(A)))
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_15_40
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_03_46
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