{ 
s:SES. es:EO+(Info). e1,e2:E. a:Atom1.
(ses-flow(s;es;a;e1;e2) 
e1 c
e2) }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-flow: ses-flow(s;es;a;e1;e2),
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-causle: e c e',
es-E: E,
all: x:A. B[x],
implies: P Q,
atom: Atom$n
Definitions :
all: x:A. B[x],
implies: P Q,
prop: 
,
and: P 
Q,
member: t 
T,
so_lambda: so_lambda(x,y,z.t[x; y; z]),
assert: 
b,
so_lambda: 
x y.t[x; y],
btrue: tt,
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
true: True,
top: Top,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
so_apply: x[s1;s2;s3],
es-E-interface: E(X),
guard: {T},
so_apply: x[s1;s2],
uimplies: b supposing a,
sq_type: SQType(T),
subtype: S 
T,
!hyp_hide: x
Lemmas :
ses-flow-implies,
es-causle_wf,
event-ordering+_inc,
es-E_wf,
es-causle_weakening_locl,
event-has_wf,
es-le_wf,
es-causl_transitivity1,
es-causl_transitivity2,
es-causle_weakening,
es-causl_wf,
sdata_wf,
eclass-val_wf,
ses-send_wf,
subtype_base_sq,
bool_wf,
bool_subtype_base,
ses-rcv_wf,
es-E-interface_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
ses-info_wf,
event-ordering+_wf,
top_wf,
es-causl_weakening,
es-causle_transitivity,
es-locl_wf,
ses-decrypted_wf,
ses-encrypted_wf,
ses-cipher_wf,
ses-crypt_wf,
ses-key-rel_wf,
ses-decryption-key_wf,
ses-encryption-key_wf,
not_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
symmetric-key_wf,
ses-decrypt_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
security-event-structure_wf,
assert_elim,
in-eclass_wf
\mforall{}s:SES. \mforall{}es:EO+(Info). \mforall{}e1,e2:E. \mforall{}a:Atom1. (ses-flow(s;es;a;e1;e2) {}\mRightarrow{} e1 c\mleq{} e2)
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_20_57
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_13_37
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