{ 
[s:SES]
[A,B:Id]. uiff(PrivateKey(A) = PrivateKey(B);A = B) supposing PropertyK }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-K: PropertyK,
ses-private-key: PrivateKey(A),
security-event-structure: SES,
encryption-key: Key,
Id: Id,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
equal: s = t
Definitions :
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
uimplies: b supposing a,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
encryption-key: Key,
ses-private-key: PrivateKey(A),
member: t 
T,
and: P 
Q,
outr: outr(x),
prop: 
,
assert: 
b,
bnot: 
b,
isl: isl(x),
btrue: tt,
bfalse: ff,
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
true: True,
outl: outl(x),
sq_type: SQType(T),
all: x:A. B[x],
implies: P 
Q,
guard: {T},
ses-K: PropertyK,
iff: P 
Q
Lemmas :
outr_wf,
Id_wf,
assert_wf,
bnot_wf,
isl_wf,
ses-private_wf,
outl_wf,
subtype_base_sq,
union_subtype_base,
atom1_subtype_base,
ses-K_wf,
security-event-structure_wf
\mforall{}[s:SES]. \mforall{}[A,B:Id]. uiff(PrivateKey(A) = PrivateKey(B);A = B) supposing PropertyK
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_26_37
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_21_40
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