{ 
[s:SES]
[pa:ProtocolAction]. [es:EO+(Info)]. [e:E].
({((fst(pa)) = "sign") 
((snd(pa)) = Sign(e))}) supposing
((
e 
Sign) and
pa(e))
supposing ActionsDisjoint }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-sign: Sign,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
sdata: SecurityData,
eclass-val: X(e),
in-eclass: e X,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-E: E,
Id: Id,
assert: b,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
guard: {T},
pi1: fst(t),
pi2: snd(t),
and: P Q,
product: x:A 
B[x],
token: "$token",
atom: Atom,
equal: s = t,
atom: Atom$n
Definitions :
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
uimplies: b supposing a,
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),
guard: {T},
and: P Q,
pi1: fst(t),
pi2: snd(t),
member: t T,
implies: P 
Q,
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
top: Top,
all: x:A. B[x],
cand: A c B,
btrue: tt,
prop: 
,
so_lambda: 
x y.t[x; y],
bfalse: ff,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
false: False,
exists: 
x:A. B[x],
bool: 
,
unit: Unit,
iff: P 
Q,
so_apply: x[s1;s2],
not: 
A,
it: 
,
subtype: S 
T
Lemmas :
eq_atom_wf,
bool_wf,
iff_weakening_uiff,
uiff_transitivity,
assert_wf,
eqtt_to_assert,
assert_of_eq_atom,
in-eclass_wf,
ses-info_wf,
ses-new_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
es-E_wf,
event-ordering+_wf,
top_wf,
eclass-val_wf,
event-ordering+_inc,
not_wf,
bnot_wf,
eqff_to_assert,
assert_of_bnot,
not_functionality_wrt_uiff,
ses-send_wf,
sdata_wf,
ses-rcv_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
ses-decrypt_wf,
ses-sign_wf,
Id_wf,
ses-verify_wf,
false_wf,
ses-is-protocol-action_wf,
protocol-action_wf,
ses-disjoint_wf,
security-event-structure_wf
\mforall{}[s:SES]
\mforall{}[pa:ProtocolAction]. \mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]. \mforall{}[e:E].
(\{((fst(pa)) = "sign") \mwedge{} ((snd(pa)) = Sign(e))\}) supposing ((\muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Sign) and pa(e))
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_40_30
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_33_47
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