{ 
s:SES
(PropertyD 
{ses-D-public(s) 
ses-D-private(s)} supposing PropertyK) }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-D-private: ses-D-private(s),
ses-D-public: ses-D-public(s),
ses-K: PropertyK,
ses-D: PropertyD,
security-event-structure: SES,
uimplies: b supposing a,
guard: {T},
all: x:A. B[x],
implies: P Q,
and: P Q
Definitions :
pi2: snd(t),
cand: A c B,
so_lambda: 
x.t[x],
isl: isl(x),
can-apply: can-apply(f;x),
IdLnk: IdLnk,
so_apply: x[s],
union: left + right,
or: P 
Q,
append: as @ bs,
locl: locl(a),
Knd: Knd,
list: type List,
l_member: (x 
l),
infix_ap: x f y,
fpf: a:A fp-> B[a],
atom: Atom,
apply: f a,
es-base-E: es-base-E(es),
token: "$token",
record-select: r.x,
eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]),
btrue: tt,
sq_type: SQType(T),
bool: 
,
in-eclass: e 
X,
subtype: S 
T,
es-E: E,
so_lambda: x y.t[x; y],
limited-type: LimitedType,
eq_atom: x =a y,
eq_atom: eq_atom$n(x;y),
rec: rec(x.A[x]),
tree: Tree(E),
dep-isect: Error :dep-isect,
record+: record+,
ses-encryption-key: key(e),
ses-decryption-key: key(e),
ses-crypt: cipherText(e),
ses-cipher: cipherText(e),
ses-encrypted: plainText(e),
ses-decrypted: plainText(e),
eclass-val: X(e),
ses-decrypt: Decrypt,
ses-info: Info,
top: Top,
ses-encrypt: Encrypt,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
event_ordering: EO,
es-causl: (e < e'),
sdata: SecurityData,
strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B),
pi1: fst(t),
le: A 
B,
ge: i 
j ,
not: 
A,
less_than: a < b,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
subtype_rel: A r B,
ses-D-private: ses-D-private(s),
universe: Type,
symmetric-key: symmetric-key(a),
ses-private: Private(A),
atom: Atom$n,
ses-private-key: PrivateKey(A),
axiom: Ax,
ses-public-key: PublicKey(A),
Id: Id,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
encryption-key: Key,
lambda: x.A[x],
pair: <a, b>,
security-event-structure: SES,
ses-D: PropertyD,
uimplies: b supposing a,
isect: 
x:A. B[x],
prop: 
,
guard: {T},
ses-D-public: ses-D-public(s),
exists: 
x:A. B[x],
es-E-interface: E(X),
set: {x:A| B[x]} ,
ses-K: PropertyK,
sym: Sym(T;x,y.E[x; y]),
ses-key-rel: MatchingKeys(k1;k2),
assert: 
b,
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y],
true: True,
member: t T,
false: False,
void: Void,
all: x:A. B[x],
iff: P 
Q,
and: P Q,
product: x:A 
B[x],
equal: s = t,
rev_implies: P Q,
implies: P Q,
function: x:A 
B[x],
sqequal: s ~ t,
Auto: Error :Auto,
CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN,
D: Error :D,
RepeatFor: Error :RepeatFor,
ORELSE: Error :ORELSE,
CollapseTHENA: Error :CollapseTHENA,
Unfold: Error :Unfold,
ParallelOp: Error :ParallelOp,
Unfolds: Error :Unfolds,
MaAuto: Error :MaAuto
Lemmas :
es-E-interface_wf,
ses-info_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
es-causl_wf,
sdata_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
event-ordering+_wf,
ses-decrypt_wf,
Id_wf,
ses-D-public_wf,
ses-D-private_wf,
guard_wf,
security-event-structure_wf,
ses-D_wf,
ses-K_wf,
symmetric-key_wf,
ses-key-rel_wf,
ses-private_wf,
ses-private-key_wf,
ses-public-key_wf,
ses-key-rel_witness,
eclass-val_wf,
es-E_wf,
event-ordering+_inc,
member_wf,
assert_wf,
false_wf,
ifthenelse_wf,
in-eclass_wf,
true_wf,
bool_wf,
subtype_base_sq,
bool_subtype_base,
assert_elim,
eclass_wf,
es-interface-top,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
es-base-E_wf,
subtype_rel_self,
top_wf,
subtype_rel_wf,
uiff_inversion,
product_subtype_base,
sdata_subtype_base,
union_subtype_base,
atom2_subtype_base,
atom1_subtype_base,
pi1_wf_top,
pi2_wf
\mforall{}s:SES. (PropertyD {}\mRightarrow{} \{ses-D-public(s) \mwedge{} ses-D-private(s)\} supposing PropertyK)
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_27_31
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_22_54
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