{ [s:SES]
    [pa:ProtocolAction]. [es:EO+(Info)]. [e:E].
      UsedAtoms(e) = pa-used(pa) supposing pa(e) 
    supposing ActionsDisjoint }

{ Proof }



Definitions occuring in Statement :  ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),  pa-used: pa-used(pa),  protocol-action: ProtocolAction,  ses-used-atoms: UsedAtoms(e),  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  ses-info: Info,  security-event-structure: SES,  event-ordering+: EO+(Info),  es-E: E,  uimplies: b supposing a,  uall: [x:A]. B[x],  list: type List,  equal: s = t,  atom: Atom$n
Definitions :  uall: [x:A]. B[x],  uimplies: b supposing a,  ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),  ses-used-atoms: UsedAtoms(e),  pa-used: pa-used(pa),  member: t  T,  ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,  eq_atom: x =a y,  and: P  Q,  top: Top,  ses-signed: signed(e),  ses-verify-sig: signature(e),  ses-verify-signed: signed(e),  ses-encrypted: plainText(e),  ses-encryption-key: key(e),  ses-cipher: cipherText(e),  ses-decryption-key: key(e),  all: x:A. B[x],  implies: P  Q,  cand: A c B,  btrue: tt,  bfalse: ff,  so_lambda: x y.t[x; y],  prop: ,  subtype: S  T,  Id: Id,  so_lambda: x.t[x],  encryption-key: Key,  false: False,  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  protocol-action: ProtocolAction,  exists: x:A. B[x],  decidable: Dec(P),  or: P  Q,  not: A,  sq_type: SQType(T),  guard: {T},  bool: ,  so_apply: x[s1;s2],  unit: Unit,  iff: P  Q,  so_apply: x[s],  it:
Lemmas :  decidable__atom_equal,  subtype_base_sq,  atom_subtype_base,  in-eclass_wf,  ses-info_wf,  ses-send_wf,  es-interface-subtype_rel2,  sdata_wf,  es-E_wf,  event-ordering+_inc,  event-ordering+_wf,  top_wf,  bool_wf,  iff_weakening_uiff,  assert_wf,  eqtt_to_assert,  not_wf,  uiff_transitivity,  bnot_wf,  eqff_to_assert,  assert_of_bnot,  ses-sign_wf,  Id_wf,  ses-verify_wf,  ses-encrypt_wf,  encryption-key_wf,  ses-decrypt_wf,  ses-new_wf,  eclass-val_wf,  ses-rcv_wf,  protocol-action_wf,  ses-disjoint_wf,  ses-is-protocol-action_wf,  security-event-structure_wf,  sdata-atoms_wf,  pi1_wf_top,  pi2_wf,  product_subtype_base,  sdata_subtype_base,  atom2_subtype_base,  atom1_subtype_base,  encryption-key-atoms_wf,  union_subtype_base,  append_wf,  eq_atom_wf,  assert_of_eq_atom,  not_functionality_wrt_uiff,  false_wf,  ifthenelse_wf

\mforall{}[s:SES]
    \mforall{}[pa:ProtocolAction].  \mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)].  \mforall{}[e:E].    UsedAtoms(e)  =  pa-used(pa)  supposing  pa(e) 
    supposing  ActionsDisjoint


Date html generated: 2011_08_17-PM-07_40_44
Last ObjectModification: 2011_06_18-PM-01_34_06

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