{ 
[ses:SES]
[es:EO+(Info)]
(([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing 
e 
Sign)
([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing e Verify)
([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing e Encrypt)
([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing e Decrypt)
([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing e New)
([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ tt supposing e Send)
([e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ tt supposing e Rcv))
supposing ActionsDisjoint }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-msg: isMsg(e),
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-decrypt: Decrypt,
ses-encrypt: Encrypt,
ses-verify: Verify,
ses-sign: Sign,
ses-rcv: Rcv,
ses-send: Send,
ses-new: New,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
in-eclass: e X,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-E: E,
assert: b,
bfalse: ff,
btrue: tt,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
and: P Q,
sqequal: s ~ t
Definitions :
guard: {T},
sq_type: SQType(T),
fpf: a:A fp-> B[a],
strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B),
le: A 
B,
ge: i 
j ,
less_than: a < b,
false: False,
limited-type: LimitedType,
natural_number: $n,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
iff: P 
Q,
eq_bool: p =b q,
lt_int: i <z j,
le_int: i z j,
eq_int: (i =
j),
null: null(as),
set_blt: a < b,
grp_blt: a < b,
infix_ap: x f y,
dcdr-to-bool: [d],
bl-all: (xL.P[x])_b,
bl-exists: (
xL.P[x])_b,
b-exists: (i<n.P[i])_b,
eq_type: eq_type(T;T'),
not: 
A,
qeq: qeq(r;s),
q_less: q_less(r;s),
q_le: q_le(r;s),
deq-member: deq-member(eq;x;L),
deq-disjoint: deq-disjoint(eq;as;bs),
deq-all-disjoint: deq-all-disjoint(eq;ass;bs),
eq_str: Error :eq_str,
eq_id: a = b,
eq_lnk: a = b,
es-eq-E: e = e',
es-bless: e <loc e',
es-ble: e loc e',
bimplies: p q,
band: p q,
bor: p 
q,
bnot: b,
int: 
,
unit: Unit,
union: left + right,
bool: 
,
implies: P Q,
cand: A c B,
rec: rec(x.A[x]),
tree: Tree(E),
btrue: tt,
ses-new: New,
ses-decrypt: Decrypt,
encryption-key: Key,
ses-encrypt: Encrypt,
ses-verify: Verify,
void: Void,
subtype: S 
T,
universe: Type,
atom: Atom,
apply: f a,
es-base-E: es-base-E(es),
token: "$token",
lambda: 
x.A[x],
es-E-interface: E(X),
subtype_rel: A r B,
decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y],
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
so_lambda: 
x y.t[x; y],
atom: Atom$n,
Id: Id,
sdata: SecurityData,
eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]),
top: Top,
exists: x:A. B[x],
function: x:A 
B[x],
all: x:A. B[x],
dep-isect: Error :dep-isect,
eq_atom: x =a y,
eq_atom: eq_atom$n(x;y),
record+: record+,
set: {x:A| B[x]} ,
record-select: r.x,
bfalse: ff,
ses-msg: isMsg(e),
ses-sign: Sign,
equal: s = t,
pair: <a, b>,
prop: 
,
member: t T,
security-event-structure: SES,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-info: Info,
and: P Q,
product: x:A 
B[x],
assert: b,
es-E: E,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
event_ordering: EO,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
so_lambda: x.t[x],
uimplies: b supposing a,
isect: 
x:A. B[x],
sqequal: s ~ t,
Try: Error :Try,
CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN,
MaAuto: Error :MaAuto,
ses-rcv: Rcv,
in-eclass: e X,
CollapseTHENA: Error :CollapseTHENA,
ses-send: Send,
Auto: Error :Auto,
ExRepD: Error :ExRepD,
Unfold: Error :Unfold,
RepeatFor: Error :RepeatFor,
D: Error :D,
tactic: Error :tactic
Lemmas :
event-ordering+_wf,
ses-info_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
ses-sign_wf,
es-interface-top,
sdata_wf,
Id_wf,
member_wf,
eclass_wf,
in-eclass_wf,
assert_wf,
es-E_wf,
ses-disjoint_wf,
security-event-structure_wf,
uall_wf,
es-base-E_wf,
subtype_rel_self,
event-ordering+_inc,
top_wf,
subtype_rel_wf,
ses-verify_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
ses-decrypt_wf,
ses-new_wf,
ses-send_wf,
ses-rcv_wf,
bool_wf,
iff_weakening_uiff,
eqtt_to_assert,
not_wf,
uiff_transitivity,
eqff_to_assert,
assert_of_bnot,
bnot_wf,
btrue_wf,
subtype_base_sq,
bool_subtype_base,
bfalse_wf,
assert_elim
\mforall{}[ses:SES]
\mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]
((\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} ff supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Sign)
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} ff supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Verify)
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} ff supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Encrypt)
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} ff supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Decrypt)
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} ff supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} New)
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} tt supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Send)
\mwedge{} (\mforall{}[e:E]. isMsg(e) \msim{} tt supposing \muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Rcv))
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_31_42
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_24_26
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