{ s:SES
    (ActionsDisjoint
     FreshSignatures([CR-initiator1{i:l}(s); 
                        
                        CR-initiator2{i:l}(s);
                         
                        CR-initiator3;
                         
                        CR-responder1{i:l}(s);
                         
                        CR-responder2{i:l}(s); CR-responder3])) }

{ Proof }



Definitions occuring in Statement :  CR-responder3: CR-responder3,  CR-responder2: CR-responder2{i:l}(s),  CR-responder1: CR-responder1{i:l}(s),  CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3,  CR-initiator2: CR-initiator2{i:l}(s),  CR-initiator1: CR-initiator1{i:l}(s),  fresh-sig-protocol1: FreshSignatures(bss),  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  security-event-structure: SES,  all: x:A. B[x],  implies: P  Q,  cons: [car / cdr],  nil: []
Definitions :  atom_eq: atomeqn def,  list_ind: list_ind def,  id-sdata: data(x),  sdata-pair: <d1, d2>,  sq_type: SQType(T),  sqequal: s ~ t,  ind: ind def,  true: True,  ses-is-fresh: ses-is-fresh(f;A;pas),  decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y],  event_ordering: EO,  int_seg: {i..j},  atom: Atom,  dep-isect: Error :dep-isect,  record+: record+,  set: {x:A| B[x]} ,  spread: spread def,  ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),  atom-sdata: data(a),  token: "$token",  mk-pa: n(v),  protocol-action: ProtocolAction,  ses-fresh-sequence: ses-fresh-sequence(f;A;pas),  ses-is-protocol-actions: pas(thr),  basic-seq-1-4: A  B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y],  basic-seq-1-5: A  B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y;z],  basic-seq-1-3: A  B: pas[A; B; m; n; x],  basic-seq-1-1: A  B: pas[A; B; m],  is-basic-seq: thr[A;B] |= bs,  rev_implies: P  Q,  iff: P  Q,  l_exists: (xL. P[x]),  ses-basic-sequence1: Basic1,  CR-responder2: CR-responder2{i:l}(s),  CR-responder1: CR-responder1{i:l}(s),  CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3,  CR-initiator2: CR-initiator2{i:l}(s),  CR-initiator1: CR-initiator1{i:l}(s),  fpf: a:A fp-> B[a],  es-E-interface: E(X),  eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]),  list: type List,  limited-type: LimitedType,  pair: <a, b>,  bfalse: ff,  btrue: tt,  universe: Type,  le_int: i z j,  eq_int: (i = j),  eq_atom: x =a y,  null: null(as),  set_blt: a < b,  grp_blt: a < b,  infix_ap: x f y,  dcdr-to-bool: [d],  bl-all: (xL.P[x])_b,  bl-exists: (xL.P[x])_b,  b-exists: (i<n.P[i])_b,  eq_type: eq_type(T;T'),  eq_atom: eq_atom$n(x;y),  qeq: qeq(r;s),  q_less: q_less(r;s),  q_le: q_le(r;s),  deq-member: deq-member(eq;x;L),  deq-disjoint: deq-disjoint(eq;as;bs),  deq-all-disjoint: deq-all-disjoint(eq;ass;bs),  eq_str: Error :eq_str,  eq_id: a = b,  eq_lnk: a = b,  es-eq-E: e = e',  es-bless: e <loc e',  es-ble: e loc e',  bimplies: p  q,  band: p  q,  bor: p q,  bnot: b,  int: ,  bool: ,  it: ,  inr: inr x ,  tree_con: tree_con(E;T),  apply: f a,  so_apply: x[s],  or: P  Q,  guard: {T},  l_member: (x  l),  subtype: S  T,  rec: rec(x.A[x]),  tree: Tree(E),  void: Void,  false: False,  select: l[i],  inl: inl x ,  sdata-atoms: sdata-atoms(d),  length: ||as||,  natural_number: $n,  lt_int: i <z j,  ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,  lambda: x.A[x],  equal: s = t,  member: t  T,  strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B),  assert: b,  tl: tl(l),  hd: hd(l),  le: A  B,  ge: i  j ,  not: A,  less_than: a < b,  uimplies: b supposing a,  and: P  Q,  uiff: uiff(P;Q),  subtype_rel: A r B,  isect: x:A. B[x],  uall: [x:A]. B[x],  sdata: SecurityData,  unit: Unit,  atom: Atom$n,  union: left + right,  prop: ,  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  security-event-structure: SES,  fresh-sig-protocol1: FreshSignatures(bss),  exists: x:A. B[x],  product: x:A  B[x],  all: x:A. B[x],  implies: P  Q,  ses-fresh-thread: ses-fresh-thread(s;es;f;A;thr),  ses-protocol1-thread: (thr is one of bss at A),  cons: [car / cdr],  nil: [],  CR-responder3: CR-responder3,  Id: Id,  ses-thread: Thread,  event-ordering+: EO+(Info),  ses-info: Info,  function: x:A  B[x],  Auto: Error :Auto,  CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN,  tactic: Error :tactic
Lemmas :  unit_wf,  sdata-atoms_wf,  length_wf1,  lt_int_wf,  ifthenelse_wf,  uiff_inversion,  sdata_wf,  length_wf_nat,  select_wf,  event-ordering+_wf,  ses-info_wf,  ses-thread_wf,  Id_wf,  ses-protocol1-thread_wf,  CR-responder3_wf,  ses-fresh-thread_wf,  fresh-sig-protocol1_wf,  security-event-structure_wf,  ses-disjoint_wf,  bool_wf,  uiff_transitivity,  eqtt_to_assert,  assert_of_lt_int,  assert_wf,  le_wf,  eqff_to_assert,  assert_functionality_wrt_uiff,  bnot_of_lt_int,  assert_of_le_int,  le_int_wf,  bnot_wf,  bfalse_wf,  member_wf,  subtype_rel_wf,  it_wf,  CR-initiator1_wf,  CR-initiator2_wf,  CR-initiator3_wf,  CR-responder1_wf,  CR-responder2_wf,  ses-basic-sequence1_wf,  false_wf,  l_member_wf,  iff_transitivity,  cons_member,  or_functionality_wrt_iff,  iff_wf,  rev_implies_wf,  nil_member,  is-basic-seq_wf,  ses-is-protocol-actions-fresh,  mk-pa_wf,  atom-sdata_wf,  protocol-action_wf,  ses-fresh-sequence_wf,  not_wf,  int_seg_wf,  assert-ses-is-fresh,  ses-is-fresh_wf,  true_wf,  subtype_base_sq,  sdata-pair_wf,  id-sdata_wf,  assert_of_eq_atom2,  assert_of_bnot,  not_functionality_wrt_uiff,  eq_atom2_self,  btrue_wf,  assert_of_eq_atom1,  eq_atom1_self

\mforall{}s:SES
    (ActionsDisjoint
    {}\mRightarrow{}  FreshSignatures([CR-initiator1\{i:l\}(s); 
                                           
                                            CR-initiator2\{i:l\}(s);
                                             
                                            CR-initiator3;  CR-responder1\{i:l\}(s);  CR-responder2\{i:l\}(s);  CR-responder3]))


Date html generated: 2011_08_17-PM-07_50_08
Last ObjectModification: 2010_12_23-AM-02_02_02

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