{ 
s:SES
    (ActionsDisjoint
    
 FreshSignatures([CR-initiator1{i:l}(s); 
                        
                        CR-initiator2{i:l}(s);
                         
                        CR-initiator3;
                         
                        CR-responder1{i:l}(s);
                         
                        CR-responder2{i:l}(s); CR-responder3])) }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement : 
CR-responder3: CR-responder3, 
CR-responder2: CR-responder2{i:l}(s), 
CR-responder1: CR-responder1{i:l}(s), 
CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3, 
CR-initiator2: CR-initiator2{i:l}(s), 
CR-initiator1: CR-initiator1{i:l}(s), 
fresh-sig-protocol1: FreshSignatures(bss), 
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint, 
security-event-structure: SES, 
all:
x:A. B[x], 
implies: P 
 Q, 
cons: [car / cdr], 
nil: []
Definitions : 
atom_eq: atomeqn def, 
list_ind: list_ind def, 
id-sdata: data(x), 
sdata-pair: <d1, d2>, 
sq_type: SQType(T), 
sqequal: s ~ t, 
ind: ind def, 
true: True, 
ses-is-fresh: ses-is-fresh(f;A;pas), 
decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y], 
event_ordering: EO, 
int_seg: {i..j
}, 
atom: Atom, 
dep-isect: Error :dep-isect, 
record+: record+, 
set: {x:A| B[x]} , 
spread: spread def, 
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e), 
atom-sdata: data(a), 
token: "$token", 
mk-pa: n(v), 
protocol-action: ProtocolAction, 
ses-fresh-sequence: ses-fresh-sequence(f;A;pas), 
ses-is-protocol-actions: pas(thr), 
basic-seq-1-4: A 
 B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y], 
basic-seq-1-5: A 
 B: pas[A;B;m;n;x;y;z], 
basic-seq-1-3: A 
 B: pas[A; B; m; n; x], 
basic-seq-1-1: A 
 B: pas[A; B; m], 
is-basic-seq: thr[A;B] |= bs, 
rev_implies: P 
 Q, 
iff: P 

 Q, 
l_exists: (
x
L. P[x]), 
ses-basic-sequence1: Basic1, 
CR-responder2: CR-responder2{i:l}(s), 
CR-responder1: CR-responder1{i:l}(s), 
CR-initiator3: CR-initiator3, 
CR-initiator2: CR-initiator2{i:l}(s), 
CR-initiator1: CR-initiator1{i:l}(s), 
fpf: a:A fp-> B[a], 
es-E-interface: E(X), 
eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]), 
list: type List, 
limited-type: LimitedType, 
pair: <a, b>, 
bfalse: ff, 
btrue: tt, 
universe: Type, 
le_int: i 
z j, 
eq_int: (i =
 j), 
eq_atom: x =a y, 
null: null(as), 
set_blt: a <
 b, 
grp_blt: a <
 b, 
infix_ap: x f y, 
dcdr-to-bool: [d]
, 
bl-all: (
x
L.P[x])_b, 
bl-exists: (
x
L.P[x])_b, 
b-exists: (
i<n.P[i])_b, 
eq_type: eq_type(T;T'), 
eq_atom: eq_atom$n(x;y), 
qeq: qeq(r;s), 
q_less: q_less(r;s), 
q_le: q_le(r;s), 
deq-member: deq-member(eq;x;L), 
deq-disjoint: deq-disjoint(eq;as;bs), 
deq-all-disjoint: deq-all-disjoint(eq;ass;bs), 
eq_str: Error :eq_str, 
eq_id: a = b, 
eq_lnk: a = b, 
es-eq-E: e = e', 
es-bless: e <loc e', 
es-ble: e 
loc e', 
bimplies: p 

 q, 
band: p 
 q, 
bor: p 
q, 
bnot: 
b, 
int:
, 
bool:
, 
it:
, 
inr: inr x , 
tree_con: tree_con(E;T), 
apply: f a, 
so_apply: x[s], 
or: P 
 Q, 
guard: {T}, 
l_member: (x 
 l), 
subtype: S 
 T, 
rec: rec(x.A[x]), 
tree: Tree(E), 
void: Void, 
false: False, 
select: l[i], 
inl: inl x , 
sdata-atoms: sdata-atoms(d), 
length: ||as||, 
natural_number: $n, 
lt_int: i <z j, 
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi , 
lambda:
x.A[x], 
equal: s = t, 
member: t 
 T, 
strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B), 
assert:
b, 
tl: tl(l), 
hd: hd(l), 
le: A 
 B, 
ge: i 
 j , 
not:
A, 
less_than: a < b, 
uimplies: b supposing a, 
and: P 
 Q, 
uiff: uiff(P;Q), 
subtype_rel: A 
r B, 
isect:
x:A. B[x], 
uall:
[x:A]. B[x], 
sdata: SecurityData, 
unit: Unit, 
atom: Atom$n, 
union: left + right, 
prop:
, 
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint, 
security-event-structure: SES, 
fresh-sig-protocol1: FreshSignatures(bss), 
exists:
x:A. B[x], 
product: x:A 
 B[x], 
all:
x:A. B[x], 
implies: P 
 Q, 
ses-fresh-thread: ses-fresh-thread(s;es;f;A;thr), 
ses-protocol1-thread: (thr is one of bss at A), 
cons: [car / cdr], 
nil: [], 
CR-responder3: CR-responder3, 
Id: Id, 
ses-thread: Thread, 
event-ordering+: EO+(Info), 
ses-info: Info, 
function: x:A 
 B[x], 
Auto: Error :Auto, 
CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN, 
tactic: Error :tactic
Lemmas : 
unit_wf, 
sdata-atoms_wf, 
length_wf1, 
lt_int_wf, 
ifthenelse_wf, 
uiff_inversion, 
sdata_wf, 
length_wf_nat, 
select_wf, 
event-ordering+_wf, 
ses-info_wf, 
ses-thread_wf, 
Id_wf, 
ses-protocol1-thread_wf, 
CR-responder3_wf, 
ses-fresh-thread_wf, 
fresh-sig-protocol1_wf, 
security-event-structure_wf, 
ses-disjoint_wf, 
bool_wf, 
uiff_transitivity, 
eqtt_to_assert, 
assert_of_lt_int, 
assert_wf, 
le_wf, 
eqff_to_assert, 
assert_functionality_wrt_uiff, 
bnot_of_lt_int, 
assert_of_le_int, 
le_int_wf, 
bnot_wf, 
bfalse_wf, 
member_wf, 
subtype_rel_wf, 
it_wf, 
CR-initiator1_wf, 
CR-initiator2_wf, 
CR-initiator3_wf, 
CR-responder1_wf, 
CR-responder2_wf, 
ses-basic-sequence1_wf, 
false_wf, 
l_member_wf, 
iff_transitivity, 
cons_member, 
or_functionality_wrt_iff, 
iff_wf, 
rev_implies_wf, 
nil_member, 
is-basic-seq_wf, 
ses-is-protocol-actions-fresh, 
mk-pa_wf, 
atom-sdata_wf, 
protocol-action_wf, 
ses-fresh-sequence_wf, 
not_wf, 
int_seg_wf, 
assert-ses-is-fresh, 
ses-is-fresh_wf, 
true_wf, 
subtype_base_sq, 
sdata-pair_wf, 
id-sdata_wf, 
assert_of_eq_atom2, 
assert_of_bnot, 
not_functionality_wrt_uiff, 
eq_atom2_self, 
btrue_wf, 
assert_of_eq_atom1, 
eq_atom1_self
\mforall{}s:SES
    (ActionsDisjoint
    {}\mRightarrow{}  FreshSignatures([CR-initiator1\{i:l\}(s); 
                                           
                                            CR-initiator2\{i:l\}(s);
                                             
                                            CR-initiator3;  CR-responder1\{i:l\}(s);  CR-responder2\{i:l\}(s);  CR-responder3]))
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_50_08
Last ObjectModification:
2010_12_23-AM-02_02_02
Home
Index