Nuprl Lemma : ses-flow-has*
∀s:SES. ∀es:EO+(Info). ∀e1,e2:E. ∀a:Atom1.
(ses-flow(s;es;a;e1;e2) ⇒ ((e1 ≤loc e2 ∧ (e2 has a)) ∨ (∃snd:E(Send). (e1 ≤loc snd ∧ (snd < e2) ∧ snd has* a))))
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
event-has*: e has* a,
ses-flow: ses-flow(s;es;a;e1;e2),
event-has: (e has a),
ses-send: Send,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
es-E-interface: E(X),
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-le: e ≤loc e' ,
es-causl: (e < e'),
es-E: E,
atom: Atom$n,
all: ∀x:A. B[x],
exists: ∃x:A. B[x],
implies: P ⇒ Q,
or: P ∨ Q,
and: P ∧ Q
Lemmas :
es-causl_transitivity2,
rel_star_weakening,
es-E_wf,
event-ordering+_subtype,
ses-info_wf,
ses-info-flow_wf,
event-has_wf,
infix_ap_wf,
es-E-interface_wf,
ses-send_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
event-ordering+_wf,
top_wf,
subtype_top,
sdata_wf,
rel_star_wf,
subtype_rel_dep_function,
es-le_wf,
es-causl_wf,
event-has*_wf,
es-causle_weakening,
es-causle-le,
es-le_transitivity,
es-causle_transitivity,
es-causle_weakening_locl,
es-le-loc,
exists_wf,
event-has*-transitive-encrypt,
assert_elim,
in-eclass_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
subtype_base_sq,
bool_wf,
bool_subtype_base,
event-has*-iff
Latex:
\mforall{}s:SES. \mforall{}es:EO+(Info). \mforall{}e1,e2:E. \mforall{}a:Atom1.
(ses-flow(s;es;a;e1;e2)
{}\mRightarrow{} ((e1 \mleq{}loc e2 \mwedge{} (e2 has a)) \mvee{} (\mexists{}snd:E(Send). (e1 \mleq{}loc snd \mwedge{} (snd < e2) \mwedge{} snd has* a))))
Date html generated:
2015_07_23-PM-00_05_42
Last ObjectModification:
2015_01_29-AM-07_52_42
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