{ 
s:SES. es:EO+(Info). e:E. a:Atom1.
(Sign(e) has a
(
e 
Sign) 
((a = signature(e)) 
(a sdata-atoms(signed(e))))) }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-signed: signed(e),
ses-sig: signature(e),
ses-sign: Sign,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
sdata-atoms: sdata-atoms(d),
sdata: SecurityData,
class-value-has: X(e) has a,
in-eclass: e X,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-E: E,
Id: Id,
assert: b,
all: x:A. B[x],
iff: P Q,
or: P Q,
and: P Q,
product: x:A 
B[x],
equal: s = t,
l_member: (x l),
atom: Atom$n
Definitions :
void: Void,
lambda: 
x.A[x],
es-E-interface: E(X),
decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y],
so_lambda: 
x y.t[x; y],
Id: Id,
sdata: SecurityData,
eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]),
union: left + right,
or: P Q,
divides: b | a,
assoced: a ~ b,
set_leq: a 
b,
set_lt: a <p b,
grp_lt: a < b,
cand: A c B,
l_member: (x l),
l_contains: A 
B,
inject: Inj(A;B;f),
reducible: reducible(a),
prime: prime(a),
squash: 
T,
l_exists: (
xL. P[x]),
l_all: (xL.P[x]),
fun-connected: y is f*(x),
qle: r s,
qless: r < s,
q-rel: q-rel(r;x),
i-finite: i-finite(I),
i-closed: i-closed(I),
p-outcome: Outcome,
fset-member: a s,
f-subset: xs ys,
fset-closed: (s closed under fs),
l_disjoint: l_disjoint(T;l1;l2),
cs-not-completed: in state s, a has not completed inning i,
cs-archived: by state s, a archived v in inning i,
cs-passed: by state s, a passed inning i without archiving a value,
cs-inning-committed: in state s, inning i has committed v,
cs-inning-committable: in state s, inning i could commit v ,
cs-archive-blocked: in state s, ws' blocks ws from archiving v in inning i,
cs-precondition: state s may consider v in inning i,
es-causl: (e < e'),
es-locl: (e <loc e'),
es-le: e loc e' ,
es-causle: e c e',
existse-before: e<e'.P[e],
existse-le: ee'.P[e],
alle-lt: e<e'.P[e],
alle-le: ee'.P[e],
alle-between1: e[e1,e2).P[e],
existse-between1: e[e1,e2).P[e],
alle-between2: e[e1,e2].P[e],
existse-between2: e[e1,e2].P[e],
existse-between3: e(e1,e2].P[e],
es-fset-loc: i locs(s),
exists: x:A. B[x],
es-r-immediate-pred: es-r-immediate-pred(es;R;e';e),
same-thread: same-thread(es;p;e;e'),
implies: P Q,
collect-event: collect-event(es;X;n;v.num[v];L.P[L];e),
cut-order: a (X;f) b,
path-goes-thru: x-f*-y thru i,
lg-edge: lg-edge(g;a;b),
infix_ap: x f y,
uimplies: b supposing a,
decidable: Dec(P),
ses-signed: signed(e),
ses-sig: signature(e),
class-value-has: X(e) has a,
subtype: S T,
universe: Type,
subtype_rel: A r B,
atom: Atom,
apply: f a,
top: Top,
es-base-E: es-base-E(es),
token: "$token",
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
isect: 
x:A. B[x],
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
dep-isect: Error :dep-isect,
eq_atom: x =a y,
eq_atom: eq_atom$n(x;y),
record+: record+,
set: {x:A| B[x]} ,
record-select: r.x,
event_ordering: EO,
all: x:A. B[x],
function: x:A 
B[x],
atom: Atom$n,
iff: P Q,
and: P Q,
product: x:A B[x],
member: t T,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
ses-info: Info,
equal: s = t,
security-event-structure: SES,
es-E: E,
MaAuto: Error :MaAuto,
ses-sign: Sign,
in-eclass: e X,
assert: b,
Decide: Error :Decide,
CollapseTHENA: Error :CollapseTHENA,
Unfolds: Error :Unfolds,
CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN,
eclass-val: X(e),
D: Error :D,
RepeatFor: Error :RepeatFor,
fpf: a:A fp-> B[a],
strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B),
le: A B,
ge: i 
j ,
less_than: a < b,
list: type List,
guard: {T},
sq_type: SQType(T),
rec: rec(x.A[x]),
tree: Tree(E),
bool: 
,
pair: <a, b>,
prop: 
,
rev_implies: P Q,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
not: 
A,
sdata-atoms: sdata-atoms(d),
free-from-atom: x:T||a,
nil: [],
append: as @ bs,
es-before: before(e),
es-le-before: loc(e),
map: map(f;as),
cons: [car / cdr],
hd: hd(l),
last: last(L),
remove-repeats: remove-repeats(eq;L),
select: l[i],
nat: 
,
dstype: dstype(TypeNames; d; a),
fset: FSet{T},
string: Error :string,
IdLnk: IdLnk,
Knd: Knd,
MaName: MaName,
consensus-state3: consensus-state3(T),
consensus-rcv: consensus-rcv(V;A),
runEvents: runEvents(r),
so_apply: x[s],
eq_knd: a = b,
fpf-dom: x dom(f),
limited-type: LimitedType,
false: False,
Auto: Error :Auto,
AssertBY: Error :AssertBY,
tactic: Error :tactic,
rev_uimplies: rev_uimplies(P;Q),
rationals: 
,
int: 
,
so_lambda: x.t[x],
pi2: snd(t),
pi1: fst(t)
Lemmas :
es-interface-subtype_rel,
pi1_wf_top,
pi2_wf,
free-from-atom-atom,
free-from-atom-Id,
sdata-free-from-atom,
decidable__l_member,
false_wf,
uiff_inversion,
decidable__atom_equal_1,
nat_wf,
l_member_subtype,
assert_wf,
l_member_wf,
rev_implies_wf,
iff_wf,
free-from-atom-pair-iff,
not_functionality_wrt_uiff,
and_functionality_wrt_uiff3,
not_wf,
iff_weakening_uiff,
iff_functionality_wrt_iff,
free-from-atom_wf1,
sdata-atoms_wf,
decidable_wf,
eclass-val_wf,
Id_wf,
sdata_wf,
subtype_rel_wf,
top_wf,
ses-info_wf,
event-ordering+_wf,
event-ordering+_inc,
subtype_rel_self,
es-base-E_wf,
es-E_wf,
ses-sign_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
es-interface-top,
member_wf,
eclass_wf,
in-eclass_wf,
decidable__assert,
security-event-structure_wf
\mforall{}s:SES. \mforall{}es:EO+(Info). \mforall{}e:E. \mforall{}a:Atom1.
(Sign(e) has a \mLeftarrow{}{}\mRightarrow{} (\muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Sign) \mwedge{} ((a = signature(e)) \mvee{} (a \mmember{} sdata-atoms(signed(e)))))
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_17_59
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_08_35
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