{ 
[s:SES]
([bss:Basic1 List]
UniqueSignatures(bss) supposing FreshSignatures(bss)) supposing
(PropertyS and
PropertyO and
ActionsDisjoint) }
{ Proof }
Definitions occuring in Statement :
unique-sig-protocol: UniqueSignatures(bss),
fresh-sig-protocol1: FreshSignatures(bss),
ses-basic-sequence1: Basic1,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-S: PropertyS,
ses-ordering: PropertyO,
security-event-structure: SES,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
list: type List
Definitions :
es-loc: loc(e),
select: l[i],
int_seg: {i..j
},
IdLnk: IdLnk,
append: as @ bs,
locl: locl(a),
Knd: Knd,
limited-type: LimitedType,
l_exists: (
x
L. P[x]),
so_apply: x[s],
l_member: (x l),
ses-sig: signature(e),
axiom: Ax,
ses-thread-member: e thr,
ses-new: New,
ses-send: Send,
rec: rec(x.A[x]),
tree: Tree(E),
ses-rcv: Rcv,
ses-encrypt: Encrypt,
encryption-key: Key,
ses-decrypt: Decrypt,
ses-verify: Verify,
guard: {T},
btrue: tt,
sq_type: SQType(T),
bool: 
,
in-eclass: e 
X,
false: False,
void: Void,
atom: Atom,
es-base-E: es-base-E(es),
token: "$token",
lambda: 
x.A[x],
so_lambda: 
x y.t[x; y],
sdata: SecurityData,
tag-by: z
T,
rev_implies: P 
Q,
iff: P 
Q,
ldag: LabeledDAG(T),
labeled-graph: LabeledGraph(T),
record: record(x.T[x]),
fset: FSet{T},
isect2: T1 
T2,
b-union: A 
B,
bag: bag(T),
true: True,
fpf-cap: f(x)?z,
event_ordering: EO,
eclass: EClass(A[eo; e]),
fpf: a:A fp-> B[a],
strong-subtype: strong-subtype(A;B),
le: A 
B,
ge: i 
j ,
not: 
A,
less_than: a < b,
uiff: uiff(P;Q),
subtype: S 
T,
decide: case b of inl(x) => s[x] | inr(y) => t[y],
ses-action: Action(e),
es-E: E,
record-select: r.x,
infix_ap: x f y,
event-has*: e has* a,
es-causl: (e < e'),
es-locl: (e <loc e'),
es-le: e loc e' ,
union: left + right,
or: P 
Q,
pair: <a, b>,
and: P 
Q,
ses-fresh-thread: ses-fresh-thread(s;es;f;A;thr),
exists: x:A. B[x],
atom: Atom$n,
ifthenelse: if b then t else f fi ,
pi1: fst(t),
dep-isect: Error :dep-isect,
eq_atom: x =a y,
eq_atom: eq_atom$n(x;y),
record+: record+,
set: {x:A| B[x]} ,
assert: 
b,
product: x:A B[x],
top: Top,
Id: Id,
ses-honest: Honest(A),
ses-protocol1: Protocol1(bss),
apply: f a,
ses-info: Info,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
ses-thread: Thread,
ses-protocol1-thread: (thr is one of bss at A),
noncelike-signatures: noncelike-signatures(s;es;thr),
implies: P Q,
unique-sig-protocol: UniqueSignatures(bss),
fresh-sig-protocol1: FreshSignatures(bss),
universe: Type,
ses-basic-sequence1: Basic1,
list: type List,
ses-S: PropertyS,
uimplies: b supposing a,
prop: 
,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
security-event-structure: SES,
ses-ordering: PropertyO,
all: x:A. B[x],
function: x:A 
B[x],
member: t T,
equal: s = t,
isect: x:A. B[x],
uall: [x:A]. B[x],
MaAuto: Error :MaAuto,
CollapseTHEN: Error :CollapseTHEN,
ses-act: Act,
ses-sign: Sign,
es-E-interface: E(X),
subtype_rel: A r B,
AssertBY: Error :AssertBY,
Auto: Error :Auto,
D: Error :D,
CollapseTHENA: Error :CollapseTHENA,
RepeatFor: Error :RepeatFor,
tactic: Error :tactic,
iseg: l1 l2,
isl: isl(x),
can-apply: can-apply(f;x),
length: ||as||,
lelt: i j < k,
int: 
,
ses-signed: signed(e),
squash: 
T,
base: Base,
so_lambda: x.t[x],
sqequal: s ~ t,
RepUR: Error :RepUR,
it: 
,
ses-thread-loc: loc(thr)= A,
Complete: Error :Complete,
BHyp: Error :BHyp,
THENM: Error :THENM,
Unfold: Error :Unfold,
ses-signer: signer(e),
ExRepD: Error :ExRepD,
es-causle: e c e',
es-p-le: e p e',
es-p-locl: e p< e',
causal-predecessor: causal-predecessor(es;p),
rel_star: R^*,
ses-crypt: cipherText(e),
sdata-atoms: sdata-atoms(d),
cand: A c B,
unit: Unit,
add: n + m,
subtract: n - m,
natural_number: $n,
free-from-atom: x:T||a,
class-value-has: X(e) has a,
eclass-val: X(e),
event-has: (e has a),
pi2: snd(t),
fpf-dom: x dom(f),
es-interface-at: X@i,
grp_car: |g|,
nat: 
,
real: 
,
rationals: 
,
outl: outl(x),
ses-nonce: PropertyN,
Try: Error :Try,
ses-NU: PropertyNU,
intensional-universe: IType,
no_repeats: no_repeats(T;l),
compat: l1 || l2,
so_apply: x[s1;s2],
divides: b | a,
assoced: a ~ b,
set_leq: a b,
set_lt: a <p b,
grp_lt: a < b,
l_contains: A B,
inject: Inj(A;B;f),
reducible: reducible(a),
prime: prime(a),
l_all: (xL.P[x]),
fun-connected: y is f*(x),
qle: r s,
qless: r < s,
q-rel: q-rel(r;x),
i-finite: i-finite(I),
i-closed: i-closed(I),
p-outcome: Outcome,
fset-member: a s,
f-subset: xs ys,
fset-closed: (s closed under fs),
l_disjoint: l_disjoint(T;l1;l2),
cs-not-completed: in state s, a has not completed inning i,
cs-archived: by state s, a archived v in inning i,
cs-passed: by state s, a passed inning i without archiving a value,
cs-inning-committed: in state s, inning i has committed v,
cs-inning-committable: in state s, inning i could commit v ,
cs-archive-blocked: in state s, ws' blocks ws from archiving v in inning i,
cs-precondition: state s may consider v in inning i,
existse-before: e<e'.P[e],
existse-le: ee'.P[e],
alle-lt: e<e'.P[e],
alle-le: ee'.P[e],
alle-between1: e[e1,e2).P[e],
existse-between1: e[e1,e2).P[e],
alle-between2: e[e1,e2].P[e],
existse-between2: e[e1,e2].P[e],
existse-between3: e(e1,e2].P[e],
es-fset-loc: i locs(s),
es-r-immediate-pred: es-r-immediate-pred(es;R;e';e),
same-thread: same-thread(es;p;e;e'),
collect-event: collect-event(es;X;n;v.num[v];L.P[L];e),
cut-order: a (X;f) b,
path-goes-thru: x-f*-y thru i,
ses-legal-sequence: Legal(pas) given prvt,
decidable: Dec(P),
lg-edge: lg-edge(g;a;b),
dstype: dstype(TypeNames; d; a),
string: Error :string,
MaName: MaName,
consensus-state3: consensus-state3(T),
consensus-rcv: consensus-rcv(V;A),
runEvents: runEvents(r),
proper-iseg: L1 < L2,
gt: i > j
Lemmas :
es-causle_antisymmetry,
decidable__atom_equal_1,
compat-common-member,
guard_wf,
decidable__lt,
uall_wf,
no_repeats_wf,
compat-no_repeats_common-member,
ses-thread-no_repeats,
intensional-universe_wf,
int_subtype_base,
le_wf,
list_subtype_base,
outl_wf,
atom1_subtype_base,
nat_wf,
ses-nonce-from-ordering,
ses-nonce-unique,
int_seg_properties,
length_wf1,
eclass-val_wf,
unit_wf,
isl_wf,
ses-signed_wf,
pi2_wf,
pi1_wf,
pi1_wf_top,
class-value-has_wf,
not_wf,
event-has_wf,
ses-sign-has-atom,
l_member_wf,
sdata-atoms_wf,
es-le_wf,
event-has*_wf,
es-causle_weakening_locl,
es-causl_weakening,
es-causl_transitivity2,
es-causle_weakening,
es-causle_wf,
es-causl_wf,
ses-signer_wf,
select_wf,
set_subtype_base,
squash_wf,
length_wf_nat,
ses-signature-unique2,
es-locl_wf,
int_seg_wf,
ses-act_wf,
member_wf,
ses-action_wf,
subtype_rel_wf,
es-E-interface_wf,
ses-info_wf,
ses-sign_wf,
event-ordering+_wf,
ses-thread_wf,
ses-protocol1-thread_wf,
noncelike-signatures_wf,
ses-protocol1_wf,
ses-honest_wf,
Id_wf,
unique-sig-protocol_wf,
fresh-sig-protocol1_wf,
ses-basic-sequence1_wf,
ses-S_wf,
ses-ordering_wf,
ses-disjoint_wf,
security-event-structure_wf,
es-E_wf,
assert_wf,
eclass_wf,
sdata_wf,
es-interface-top,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
es-base-E_wf,
subtype_rel_self,
event-ordering+_inc,
top_wf,
false_wf,
ifthenelse_wf,
in-eclass_wf,
true_wf,
bool_wf,
subtype_base_sq,
bool_subtype_base,
assert_elim,
ses-verify_wf,
ses-decrypt_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
ses-rcv_wf,
ses-send_wf,
ses-new_wf,
ses-thread-member_wf,
ses-sig_wf
\mforall{}[s:SES]
(\mforall{}[bss:Basic1 List]. UniqueSignatures(bss) supposing FreshSignatures(bss)) supposing
(PropertyS and
PropertyO and
ActionsDisjoint)
Date html generated:
2011_08_17-PM-07_45_03
Last ObjectModification:
2011_06_18-PM-01_40_32
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