Nuprl Lemma : ses-sign-is-protocol-action
∀[s:SES]
∀[pa:ProtocolAction]. ∀[es:EO+(Info)]. ∀[e:E].
({((fst(pa)) = "sign" ∈ Atom) ∧ ((snd(pa)) = Sign(e) ∈ (SecurityData × Id × Atom1))}) supposing
((↑e ∈b Sign) and
pa(e))
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-sign: Sign,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
sdata: SecurityData,
eclass-val: X(e),
in-eclass: e ∈b X,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-E: E,
Id: Id,
atom: Atom$n,
assert: ↑b,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
guard: {T},
pi1: fst(t),
pi2: snd(t),
and: P ∧ Q,
product: x:A × B[x],
token: "$token",
atom: Atom,
equal: s = t ∈ T
Lemmas :
eq_atom_wf,
bool_wf,
eqtt_to_assert,
assert_of_eq_atom,
le_antisymmetry_iff,
add_functionality_wrt_le,
add-commutes,
le-add-cancel2,
assert_wf,
in-eclass_wf,
ses-info_wf,
ses-new_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
es-E_wf,
event-ordering+_subtype,
event-ordering+_wf,
top_wf,
subtype_top,
equal-wf-T-base,
eclass-val_wf,
atom1_subtype_base,
eqff_to_assert,
equal_wf,
bool_cases_sqequal,
subtype_base_sq,
bool_subtype_base,
assert-bnot,
neg_assert_of_eq_atom,
ses-send_wf,
sdata_wf,
ses-rcv_wf,
ses-encrypt_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
ses-decrypt_wf,
ses-sign_wf,
Id_wf,
ses-verify_wf,
false_wf,
ses-is-protocol-action_wf,
protocol-action_wf,
ses-disjoint_wf,
security-event-structure_wf
Latex:
\mforall{}[s:SES]
\mforall{}[pa:ProtocolAction]. \mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]. \mforall{}[e:E].
(\{((fst(pa)) = "sign") \mwedge{} ((snd(pa)) = Sign(e))\}) supposing ((\muparrow{}e \mmember{}\msubb{} Sign) and pa(e))
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Date html generated:
2015_07_23-PM-00_15_06
Last ObjectModification:
2015_01_29-AM-01_33_18
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