Nuprl Lemma : ses-msg-cases

∀[ses:SES]
  ∀[es:EO+(Info)]
    ((∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing ↑e ∈b Sign)
    ∧ (∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing ↑e ∈b Verify)
    ∧ (∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing ↑e ∈b Encrypt)
    ∧ (∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing ↑e ∈b Decrypt)
    ∧ (∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ ff supposing ↑e ∈b New)
    ∧ (∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ tt supposing ↑e ∈b Send)
    ∧ (∀[e:E]. isMsg(e) ~ tt supposing ↑e ∈b Rcv)) 
  supposing ActionsDisjoint


Proof




Definitions occuring in Statement :  ses-msg: isMsg(e),  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  ses-decrypt: Decrypt,  ses-encrypt: Encrypt,  ses-verify: Verify,  ses-sign: Sign,  ses-rcv: Rcv,  ses-send: Send,  ses-new: New,  ses-info: Info,  security-event-structure: SES,  in-eclass: e ∈b X,  event-ordering+: EO+(Info),  es-E: E,  assert: ↑b,  bfalse: ff,  btrue: tt,  uimplies: b supposing a,  uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],  and: P ∧ Q,  sqequal: s ~ t
Lemmas :  in-eclass_wf,  ses-info_wf,  ses-send_wf,  es-interface-subtype_rel2,  es-E_wf,  event-ordering+_subtype,  event-ordering+_wf,  top_wf,  subtype_top,  sdata_wf,  bool_wf,  eqtt_to_assert,  le_antisymmetry_iff,  add_functionality_wrt_le,  add-commutes,  le-add-cancel2,  eqff_to_assert,  equal_wf,  bool_cases_sqequal,  subtype_base_sq,  bool_subtype_base,  assert-bnot,  iff_imp_equal_bool,  ses-rcv_wf,  bfalse_wf,  assert_wf,  false_wf,  ses-sign_wf,  Id_wf,  ses-verify_wf,  ses-encrypt_wf,  encryption-key_wf,  ses-decrypt_wf,  ses-new_wf,  assert_elim,  and_wf,  bnot_wf,  btrue_neq_bfalse,  btrue_wf,  true_wf,  ses-disjoint_wf,  security-event-structure_wf

Latex:
\mforall{}[ses:SES]
    \mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]
        ((\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  ff  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Sign)
        \mwedge{}  (\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  ff  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Verify)
        \mwedge{}  (\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  ff  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Encrypt)
        \mwedge{}  (\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  ff  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Decrypt)
        \mwedge{}  (\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  ff  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  New)
        \mwedge{}  (\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  tt  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Send)
        \mwedge{}  (\mforall{}[e:E].  isMsg(e)  \msim{}  tt  supposing  \muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Rcv)) 
    supposing  ActionsDisjoint



Date html generated: 2015_07_23-PM-00_09_26
Last ObjectModification: 2015_01_29-AM-07_53_50

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