Nuprl Lemma : member-used-atoms

∀s:SES
  (ActionsDisjoint
  ⇒ (∀es:EO+(Info). ∀e:E. ∀a:Atom1.
        ((a ∈ UsedAtoms(e))
        ⇐⇒ ((↑e ∈b Send) ∧ (a ∈ sdata-atoms(Send(e))))
            ∨ ((↑e ∈b Decrypt) ∧ ((a = cipherText(e) ∈ Atom1) ∨ (a ∈ encryption-key-atoms(key(e)))))
            ∨ ((↑e ∈b Verify) ∧ ((a = signature(e) ∈ Atom1) ∨ (a ∈ sdata-atoms(signed(e)))))
            ∨ ((↑e ∈b Sign) ∧ (a ∈ sdata-atoms(signed(e))))
            ∨ ((↑e ∈b Encrypt) ∧ ((a ∈ sdata-atoms(plainText(e))) ∨ (a ∈ encryption-key-atoms(key(e))))))))


Proof




Definitions occuring in Statement :  ses-used-atoms: UsedAtoms(e),  ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,  ses-cipher: cipherText(e),  ses-decryption-key: key(e),  ses-decrypt: Decrypt,  ses-encryption-key: key(e),  ses-encrypted: plainText(e),  ses-encrypt: Encrypt,  ses-verify-sig: signature(e),  ses-verify-signed: signed(e),  ses-verify: Verify,  ses-signed: signed(e),  ses-sign: Sign,  ses-send: Send,  ses-info: Info,  security-event-structure: SES,  encryption-key-atoms: encryption-key-atoms(k),  sdata-atoms: sdata-atoms(d),  eclass-val: X(e),  in-eclass: e ∈b X,  event-ordering+: EO+(Info),  es-E: E,  l_member: (x ∈ l),  atom: Atom$n,  assert: ↑b,  all: ∀x:A. B[x],  iff: P ⇐⇒ Q,  implies: P ⇒ Q,  or: P ∨ Q,  and: P ∧ Q,  equal: s = t ∈ T
Lemmas :  in-eclass_wf,  ses-info_wf,  ses-send_wf,  es-interface-subtype_rel2,  es-E_wf,  event-ordering+_subtype,  event-ordering+_wf,  top_wf,  subtype_top,  sdata_wf,  bool_wf,  eqtt_to_assert,  l_member_wf,  sdata-atoms_wf,  eclass-val_wf,  le_antisymmetry_iff,  add_functionality_wrt_le,  add-commutes,  le-add-cancel2,  or_wf,  true_wf,  assert_wf,  ses-decrypt_wf,  encryption-key_wf,  equal-wf-base-T,  atom1_subtype_base,  ses-cipher_wf,  encryption-key-atoms_wf,  ses-decryption-key_wf,  ses-verify_wf,  Id_wf,  ses-verify-sig_wf,  ses-verify-signed_wf,  ses-sign_wf,  ses-signed_wf,  ses-encrypt_wf,  ses-encrypted_wf,  ses-encryption-key_wf,  eqff_to_assert,  equal_wf,  bool_cases_sqequal,  subtype_base_sq,  bool_subtype_base,  assert-bnot,  false_wf,  cons_wf,  cons_member,  append_wf,  member_append,  null_nil_lemma,  btrue_wf,  member-implies-null-eq-bfalse,  btrue_neq_bfalse,  nil_wf,  ses-disjoint_wf,  security-event-structure_wf

Latex:
\mforall{}s:SES
    (ActionsDisjoint
    {}\mRightarrow{}  (\mforall{}es:EO+(Info).  \mforall{}e:E.  \mforall{}a:Atom1.
                ((a  \mmember{}  UsedAtoms(e))
                \mLeftarrow{}{}\mRightarrow{}  ((\muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Send)  \mwedge{}  (a  \mmember{}  sdata-atoms(Send(e))))
                        \mvee{}  ((\muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Decrypt)  \mwedge{}  ((a  =  cipherText(e))  \mvee{}  (a  \mmember{}  encryption-key-atoms(key(e)))))
                        \mvee{}  ((\muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Verify)  \mwedge{}  ((a  =  signature(e))  \mvee{}  (a  \mmember{}  sdata-atoms(signed(e)))))
                        \mvee{}  ((\muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Sign)  \mwedge{}  (a  \mmember{}  sdata-atoms(signed(e))))
                        \mvee{}  ((\muparrow{}e  \mmember{}\msubb{}  Encrypt)
                            \mwedge{}  ((a  \mmember{}  sdata-atoms(plainText(e)))  \mvee{}  (a  \mmember{}  encryption-key-atoms(key(e))))))))



Date html generated: 2015_07_23-PM-00_10_25
Last ObjectModification: 2015_01_29-AM-07_53_55

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