Nuprl Lemma : ses-is-protocol-action-used
∀[s:SES]
∀[pa:ProtocolAction]. ∀[es:EO+(Info)]. ∀[e:E]. UsedAtoms(e) = pa-used(pa) ∈ (Atom1 List) supposing pa(e)
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Proof
Definitions occuring in Statement :
ses-is-protocol-action: pa(e),
pa-used: pa-used(pa),
protocol-action: ProtocolAction,
ses-used-atoms: UsedAtoms(e),
ses-disjoint: ActionsDisjoint,
ses-info: Info,
security-event-structure: SES,
event-ordering+: EO+(Info),
es-E: E,
list: T List,
atom: Atom$n,
uimplies: b supposing a,
uall: ∀[x:A]. B[x],
equal: s = t ∈ T
Lemmas :
decidable__atom_equal,
subtype_base_sq,
atom_subtype_base,
in-eclass_wf,
ses-info_wf,
ses-send_wf,
es-interface-subtype_rel2,
es-E_wf,
event-ordering+_subtype,
event-ordering+_wf,
top_wf,
subtype_top,
sdata_wf,
bool_wf,
eqtt_to_assert,
le_antisymmetry_iff,
add_functionality_wrt_le,
add-commutes,
le-add-cancel2,
eqff_to_assert,
equal_wf,
bool_cases_sqequal,
bool_subtype_base,
assert-bnot,
ses-decrypt_wf,
encryption-key_wf,
nil_wf,
assert_wf,
ses-new_wf,
equal-wf-T-base,
eclass-val_wf,
atom1_subtype_base,
list_wf,
sdata-atoms_wf,
squash_wf,
true_wf,
iff_weakening_equal,
assert_elim,
bfalse_wf,
and_wf,
bnot_wf,
btrue_neq_bfalse,
ses-rcv_wf,
ses-sign_wf,
Id_wf,
pi1_wf_top,
subtype_rel_product,
ses-verify_wf,
cons_wf,
ses-verify-sig_wf,
pi2_wf,
ite_rw_true,
ses-encrypt_wf,
append_wf,
ses-encrypted_wf,
encryption-key-atoms_wf,
ses-encryption-key_wf,
ses-cipher_wf,
ses-decryption-key_wf,
protocol-action_wf,
ses-disjoint_wf,
ses-is-protocol-action_wf,
security-event-structure_wf,
iff_wf,
false_wf,
equal-wf-base,
eq_atom_wf,
iff_imp_equal_bool,
neg_assert_of_eq_atom,
assert_of_eq_atom
Latex:
\mforall{}[s:SES]
\mforall{}[pa:ProtocolAction]. \mforall{}[es:EO+(Info)]. \mforall{}[e:E]. UsedAtoms(e) = pa-used(pa) supposing pa(e)
supposing ActionsDisjoint
Date html generated:
2015_07_23-PM-00_15_09
Last ObjectModification:
2015_07_16-AM-09_37_20
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